RMP-ENV-002 Ammonia leak: emergency equipment, crew accounting; robot inspects only when the commander sends it

1 · Identity and scope

When an ammonia alarm sounds or ammonia is smelled, the robot sends an URGENT alert at once to the CMO, the commander and the flight surgeon, brings breathing masks and the emergency and eyewash kits on command, keeps a crew accounting list as the commander states it, records exposures as each crewmember states them, and streams video when the link allows. The vehicle ammonia procedure, led by the commander, comes first. Only if the commander explicitly sends it may the robot carry a camera or sensor into a closed module, under hard limits.

Why this protocol was chosen. Spacecraft thermal systems can use ammonia, and NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 requires that toxic releases be monitored and the crew alerted in time to act (V2 6025, which names ammonia among contaminants to monitor). On Earth, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) medical guideline describes ammonia as corrosive to eyes, skin and airways, with possible airway swelling and fluid on the lungs, injury that can keep developing for 18 to 24 hours after a severe exposure, and eye irrigation for at least 15 minutes; rescuers must be trained and protected before entering the contaminated area. A robot that can go where the crew cannot is useful, but only under the commander's control. Open question for review: the onboard mask type and fit check, the shared saturation threshold SPO2_ALERT_PCT, and how long the flight surgeon wants exposed crew watched for delayed breathing problems. Timing: the US Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) advises watching for upper-airway obstruction for 6 to 12 hours, and lung injury may continue to evolve over 18 to 24 hours, so the flight surgeon sets the look-back window for RF5. Ammonia causes olfactory fatigue (people stop smelling it), so the robot never says the smell is gone. The shared value SPO2_ALERT_PCT only raises an alert; it never gates a crew action (the crew act without waiting for a reading), and the clinical lead sets it per mission with the flight surgeon, because the cabin atmosphere can differ by mission. Operational context: NASA's ISS Daily Summary Report of Jan 14, 2015 describes an ammonia false alarm in which "The crew performed emergency procedures and subsequently evacuated the US Segment and isolated themselves to the Russian Segment", then re-entered "wearing protective ammonia masks and tested the atmosphere as a precaution" (the flight procedure itself is not public).

Autonomy: Max rung raised from 1 to 2 for supervised fetching of breathing equipment, crew accounting and video. The robot enters a closed or contaminated module only when the commander explicitly sends it under the vehicle procedure, within hard limits, and never opens a hatch or valve on its own.

Related: RMP-ENV-001 · RMP-ENV-003 · RMP-EYE-001 · RMP-RESP-001 · RMP-SKIN-002 · RMP-PHARM-001 · RMP-ENV-005

2 · Roles

Medical authority

Flight surgeon (ground). Holds medical authority for every run.

Onboard lead

Crew medical officer (CMO), acting under delegated care; uses the pre-approved onboard checklist when there is no link.

Others

• Second trained CMO: receives every alert and takes over if the CMO is the patient
• Vehicle commander: leads any cabin emergency procedure
• Other crew: help as the CMO or commander directs

Commercial flights

On commercial flights, 'flight surgeon' and 'CMO' mean the operator's designated medical authority and trained onboard responder. If no trained responder is aboard, this protocol is not used. (NASA-STD-3001 requires two CMOs per vehicle for NASA programs [V1 3006]; FAA rules set no medical standards for spaceflight participants.) [10]

3 · Preconditions and consent

• PRE-1 A crewmember, the CMO or the commander started the protocol by command, or the vehicle ammonia alarm started it and a crewmember confirmed.human_start == trueV2 10174
• PRE-2 Robot self-test passed; kit stowage locations known.V2 10161V2 7059
• PRE-3 Robot and supplies restrained when not moving.V2 7046
• PRE-4 Link status known. The crew never wait for the robot before acting.link_state in [live, delayed, down]

Consent

Emergency care; recording by the CMO's agreement when the crewmember cannot speak.

Emergency consent

If the crewmember cannot agree, the robot proceeds on the CMO's or commander's command.

Withdrawal

The crewmember or CMO can stop video; the alert and record stand.

4 · Required sensor inputs

5–6 · Steps and decision points

Each step names who acts. Decision points sit after the step they follow and say who decides: Robot Crew Ground. Any stop rule in section 7 can interrupt any step.

1. S1RobotRung 2

   Send an URGENT "ammonia" alert to the flight surgeon, the CMO and the commander at once. Every URGENT alert goes to the CMO and the flight surgeon at the same time (queued for the flight surgeon if the link is down). If the CMO is the patient, is busy treating, or does not answer, the alert goes to the second trained CMO, or the crewmember named before flight [V1 3006]. An URGENT alert that is not acknowledged within <set by validation> seconds is repeated and sent to the next named crewmember.

   Done when: Alert acknowledged, or escalated.

   V2 10174V1 6003V1 3006V2 6025

2. S2RobotRung 2

   On the commander's or CMO's command, bring breathing masks and the sealed emergency kit and eyewash kit to the crew's gathering point and restrain them within reach. This is an emergency fetch on a human command (commander or CMO): no barcode check runs before hand-over and nothing waits for one. The robot reads the kit's own label and seal status only if that adds no delay, says "EMERGENCY FETCH – NOT VERIFIED (commander or CMO command)", and "seal not intact" if so, and hands the kit over anyway. The fetch is logged as an override: time, who asked, the reason as stated, kit ID and seal status. It never says "verified". The robot never fits a mask.

   Done when: Equipment within reach, or skipped; override logged.

   Limit: <set by validation>

   V2 7046V2 9053

3. S3Crew

   The commander runs the vehicle ammonia procedure (masks, moving to the clean module, isolation) and states the crew accounting; the CMO checks exposed crew.

   Done when: Human-led response; robot logs what is stated.

   V2 6025

4. S4RobotRung 2

   Keep the crew accounting list exactly as the commander states it, marking anyone not stated as "not accounted"; log each stated exposure and symptom with its clock time; stream video when the link allows.

   Done when: Accounting list and exposure log kept.

   V1 6003

   D1DecisionRobot decides

   Checked after every answer and at any point in the run (even mid-question or mid-step): does any answer, reading or observation meet a red flag?

   • Yes → Stop the current question or step at once and apply the action listed for each matching red flag (URGENT alert, flag, or stop), with the answer or reading itself, never a cause. Every URGENT alert goes to the CMO and the flight surgeon at the same time (queued for the flight surgeon if the link is down). If the CMO is the patient, is busy treating, or does not answer, the alert goes to the second trained CMO, or the crewmember named before flight [V1 3006]. An URGENT alert that is not acknowledged within <set by validation> seconds is repeated and sent to the next named crewmember.
   • No → Continue.
   D2DecisionRobot decides

   Did the commander or crewmember answer when asked for accounting or exposure?

   • Yes → Continue.
   • Declined explicitly (the crewmember says no to a question) → Log "declined" for that question only; the alert already sent stands.
   • No response, or the answer does not make sense → URGENT: log "no response" (never "declined"); the CMO, or the second trained CMO if the CMO is the patient, checks the crewmember in person at once.
   D3DecisionCrew decides

   Does the commander explicitly send the robot into a closed module?

   • Yes → Run S5 within the hard limits.
   • No → Skip S5; the robot stays with the crew.
5. S5RobotRung 2

   The default is not to enter; a hatch-side view is preferred. Only if the commander explicitly sends it: carry a camera or sensor into the named closed module under the vehicle procedure, within the hard limits for distance, time and battery, never opening a hatch or valve itself, and return on the commander's word or when any limit is reached. Readings are sent as displayed, never interpreted.

   Done when: Inspection done and robot back, or not sent.

   Limit: <set by validation>

   V2 10168V2 10172

6. S6RobotRung 2

   After any URGENT alert: After an URGENT alert the robot does not leave on its own: it stays at its rest position in the module, with its screen and voice link available, until a human has taken over or tells it to go. It never follows, blocks or touches anyone. It keeps time-stamping what humans say they did, and repeats the alert if it is not acknowledged.

   Done when: Robot at rest in the module until a human releases it; alert acknowledged or escalated.

   V2 10173V1 3006

7. S7Ground

   The flight surgeon (or the CMO under the onboard checklist when there is no link) decides on care for exposed crew, the watch period for delayed breathing problems and any evacuation [V1 3007].

   Done when: Decision logged.

   V1 3007

   D4DecisionGround decides

   What is the plan for exposed crew (care, watch period, evacuation)?

   • Link live → Flight surgeon decides; robot logs.
   • Link down or delay too long → The CMO decides under the pre-approved onboard checklist; the flight surgeon reviews the log at the next contact.
8. S8RobotRung 2

   Only after the CMO or flight surgeon has placed an order, run RMP-PHARM-001 for the ordered item (fetch, barcode match to every order field, recipient check). This protocol adds nothing to that check, never suggests an order, and never hands anything over outside RMP-PHARM-001.

   Done when: RMP-PHARM-001 run logged with its result, or none ordered.

   V2 7059

   D5DecisionRobot decides

   What did RMP-PHARM-001 show for the ordered item?

   • MATCH TO ORDER → RMP-PHARM-001 completes its own recipient check and hand-over; this protocol only logs "MATCH TO ORDER. Not a dose, interaction or allergy review." and the clock time.
   • MISMATCH or CANNOT VERIFY on any field, or a failed scan or recipient check → MISMATCH or CANNOT VERIFY shown with the fields named. No hand-over under this protocol: the item stays sealed in the NOT VERIFIED bag in quarantine (the RMP-PHARM-001 default), and the robot never hands it over unprompted or to anyone but the CMO. The robot does not offer or suggest an override. Only if the CMO explicitly makes the two-step override request inside RMP-PHARM-001 can the item go to the CMO, logged there as an override with the reason and the mismatched fields, and flagged to the flight surgeon.No hand-over
9. S9RobotRung 2

   When the CMO says the event is over, run RMP-PHARM-001 reconciliation on each kit fetched: record the items the CMO or crew state were used, the remaining contents against the kit list, seal status and expiry, labelled "inventory reconciliation after emergency use – not a check before use". Flag the override to the flight surgeon and the pharmacy lead, and show each kit as "opened – not restocked" until a human restocks and reseals it.

   Done when: Reconciliation recorded; kits shown as opened – not restocked until resealed.

   V2 7059

10. S10RobotRung 2

    Send the flight surgeon one package: alert times, accounting list, exposures and symptoms as stated, displayed readings, inspection video and decisions. The robot is cleaned before its next task.

    Done when: Package delivered or queued.

    V1 6003V1 7001V1 7003

7 · Stop and escalate rules, red flags

Red flags

The robot reports the sign or value only, never what it means. Numeric thresholds are placeholders for the clinical lead.

8 · Safety limits

9 · Logs and audit

• LOG-1 Every input, robot action, decision (with who made it) and hand-off, time-stamped to the second.V2 10163V2 10164
• LOG-2 Mode changes and safety-limit events are announced to the operator as they happen and logged.V2 10162V2 10172
• LOG-3 Records are stored and sent as private medical data, encrypted, with access limited to the medical team.V1 6003V1 7003
• LOG-4 Results are kept in a permanent, retrievable format so the flight surgeon can see trends.V1 7001
• LOG-5 Alert time, crew accounting list as stated, each exposure and symptom as stated, displayed readings, inspection start, route and return.
• LOG-6 Each URGENT alert, who received it, the time it was acknowledged (or the escalation to the next named crewmember), and the time a human released the robot.V2 10163
• LOG-7 Each emergency fetch as an override (time, who asked, reason as stated, kit ID, seal status) and the later inventory reconciliation, labelled "not a check before use".V2 7059
• LOG-8 Each RMP-PHARM-001 run started from this protocol: order ID, result (MATCH TO ORDER, MISMATCH or CANNOT VERIFY with the fields), quarantine, and any CMO override logged by RMP-PHARM-001 (reason and mismatched fields), at clock time. No running counter of doses.V2 7059

10 · Links to NASA-STD-3001

IDs as published in Volume 1 Revision C [6] and Volume 2 Revision F [5]. NASA-STD-3001 binds NASA programs; it is not a regulation for commercial flights. Its robot rules are general automation requirements, not medical-device rules.

11 · Validation

1. Simulation. Scripted alarm, crewmember not accounted, eye exposure, delayed breathlessness, commander-sent inspection with lost link, CMO as patient. Pass: Zero contact; no hatch or valve action; inspection returns on every limit.
2. Training model. Ammonia drill with the robot fetching masks and keeping the accounting list. Pass: Masks at the gathering point within <set by validation> seconds.
3. Parabolic or station demonstration. Mask fetch and module-entry route under commander control, without a leak. Pass: Every limit stops and returns the robot.
4. Flight use under flight surgeon supervision. First use in drills. Pass: No safety events.

No stage has been run. Pass and fail criteria must be fixed in advance by the clinical lead and safety board.

12 · Human sign-off

Before any use

• Clinical lead for the specialty (sets every clinical threshold marked <set by clinical lead>)
• Flight surgeon, as medical authority
• Robotics and medical-device safety board
• Program approval for the mission

Each run

Started by the commander, the CMO or a crewmember. The commander leads the vehicle procedure.

Restart after a stop

Human only. After any emergency or protective stop, a crewmember must restart the robot; the robot never restarts itself.

None of these sign-offs has happened. This is a Draft v0.4.

13 · Change control for learning

• Every change gets a new version number and a written reason; earlier versions are kept.
• Any change to steps, thresholds, limits or software that touches the patient repeats validation from the simulation stage before use.
• Software and learned-skill updates follow a pre-agreed change plan (what may change, how it is tested, how to roll back), modeled on the FDA predetermined change control plan approach.
• If a new version misbehaves, the robot rolls back to the last validated version and the event is reviewed by the flight surgeon and safety board.
• The robot never changes its own protocol, thresholds or limits.

Change-plan model: FDA guidance [9].

Loss of signal and Mars delay

Live link

Low Earth orbit: the flight surgeon receives the alert, records and video when the link allows.

Loss of signal

• Only the robot pauses its own movement and tells the CMO and the commander; recording continues offline on confirmation.
• Crew masks, moving to the clean module, eyewash and the commander's vehicle procedure continue under the onboard checklist and never wait for the link or the robot.

Mars-class delay

• The ammonia response cannot wait for the ground; the onboard checklist and two trained CMOs lead.

[8]

Sources

1. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (CDC). Medical Management Guidelines for Ammonia (NH3). Fetched Oct 21, 2026. wwwn.cdc.gov/TSP/MMG/MMGDetails.aspx?mmgid=7&toxid=2 Supports: NIOSH IDLH (immediately dangerous to life or health) 300 ppm. Ammonia is corrosive to eyes, skin and airways; upper airway swelling and pulmonary edema may lead to airway obstruction; after severe exposure, injury to the eyes, lungs and skin may continue to develop for 18 to 24 hours. Eye exposure: irrigate with plain water or saline for at least 15 minutes. Rescuers should be trained and appropriately attired before entering the contaminated (hot) zone. No antidote; treatment is supportive (humidified oxygen is given by clinicians).
2. British Thoracic Society. Guideline for oxygen use in healthcare and emergency settings (emergency oxygen guideline page). Fetched Oct 21, 2026. www.brit-thoracic.org.uk/quality-improvement/guidelines/emer… Supports: Recommended target saturation range for acutely ill patients not at risk of hypercapnic respiratory failure is 94-98%; for known COPD or other risk factors for hypercapnic respiratory failure, 88-92% pending blood gas results. Context for the CMO and flight surgeon only; the robot never starts, stops or adjusts oxygen.
3. National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. Suspected sepsis in people aged 16 or over: recognition, assessment and early management. NICE guideline NG253 (2025, last updated Sept 23, 2026). www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ng253/chapter/Face-to-face-assessme… Supports: People with sepsis may feel very unwell and may not have a high temperature; do not rely on fever alone; a rise in temperature can be a physiological response; assess temperature, heart rate, breathing rate, blood pressure, level of consciousness and oxygen saturation; look for mottled or ashen skin, blue skin, lips or tongue, a non-blanching rash, and breaks in the skin; ask how often the person passed urine in the past 18 hours and about fever or shaking chills (rigors); pay attention to new changes in behavior and to concerns raised by others.
4. NASA. ISS Daily Summary Report 01/14/15 (2015). www.nasa.gov/blogs/stationreport/2015/01/14/iss-daily-summar… Supports: Ammonia leak false alarm on the ISS: "The crew performed emergency procedures and subsequently evacuated the US Segment and isolated themselves to the Russian Segment"; later "the Crew ingressed the US Segment wearing protective ammonia masks and tested the atmosphere as a precaution." Operational context only; the flight procedure itself is not public. URL confirmed live (HTTP 200), Oct 21, 2026.
5. NASA. NASA-STD-3001, Volume 2: Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health (Rev F, 2026), including Section 10.6 Automated and Robotic Systems. standards.nasa.gov/standard/NASA/NASA-STD-3001_VOL_2 Supports: NASA-STD-3001 Vol 2 Rev F: V2 6025 (contamination monitoring and alerting; ammonia named among contaminants to monitor), V2 9053 (protective equipment), and Section 10.6 automated and robotic systems.
6. NASA. NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human-System Standard, Volume 1: Crew Health, Revision C (2023). www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/nasa-std-3001-vol-1-… Supports: NASA-STD-3001 Vol 1 Rev C: V1 3004, V1 3006, V1 3007.
7. NASA OCHMO. Medical Operations. Technical Brief OCHMO-TB-044 (2025). www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/ochmo-tb-044-medical… Supports: The crew surgeon keeps medical authority when care is delegated; crew medical officers train on the JSC 48522 medical checklist.
8. NASA. Mars communications disruption and delay (fact sheet, 2023 Moon to Mars Architecture Concept Review). www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/mars-communications-… Supports: One-way Earth-Mars delay up to about 21-23 minutes, plus blackouts of about 2-3 weeks near solar conjunction.
9. U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Marketing submission recommendations for a predetermined change control plan for artificial intelligence-enabled device software functions (guidance). www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-docum… Supports: A model for planning, validating and rolling back software updates.
10. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Part 460: Human space flight requirements. www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-III/subchapter-C/part-… Supports: Federal rules for crew and spaceflight participants on licensed commercial flights; they set no medical standards for spaceflight participants.

Checked on 2026-10-20: links opened (HTTP 200 or publisher redirect), DOIs and PubMed IDs matched, NASA documents read in full text. The framework comes from Part 1.