Earth-independent operations
Also: EIHSO · Human systems integration
Distance from EarthIsolation & ConfinementBehavioral Health & SleepIn-flightEntry, Descent & LandingLunar surfaceMars transit & surfacePublicClinicianResearcher
- Spacecraft regularly have serious malfunctions: about 1.7 per year on the ISS, and significant anomalies on 10 of 11 crewed Apollo missions. Crews have relied on Mission Control to resolve them. ◆◆◆◇ Moderate · F
- For Mars, NASA rates this risk 5×5, requiring mitigation. ◆◆◆◆ High · E
Proposed certainty (◆ High → ◇ Very low) and evidence-type tags: F flight · A analog · M model/animal · C computational · E expert/operational/standards. AI-proposed, pending reviewer confirmation. How to read the grades.
NASA risk title (verbatim)
Risk of Adverse Mission Outcomes Due to Earth Independent Human-Systems Operations
NASA short title: EIHSO · HRP element: Human Factors and Behavioral Performance (HFBP) · Status: Active [current research ongoing] [1]
What it is
On deep-space missions, crew will no longer have real-time support from Mission Control. They will have to do critical tasks that flight controllers used to do [1]. This risk concerns whether vehicle and habitat design, computer interfaces, automation and robotics, training, and task design support crew health and performance [1]. It combines five older human-factors risks: habitat design, human–automation/robotic integration, human–computer interaction, training, and mission/task design [1].
Current evidence
- On the ISS, critical malfunctions that needed crew and Mission Control to manage them happened about 1.7 times per year over the station’s lifetime, and 3–4 times per year in the early “burn-in” phase. Spacewalk data, not included, would raise the rate [1].
- In the Apollo program, 10 of 11 crewed missions had significant anomalies in which the crew relied heavily on real-time Mission Control expertise [1].
- NASA tracks the long-term health outcomes of these demands under other risks [1].
NASA’s risk posture
NASA scores each risk for each design reference mission (DRM) as likelihood × consequence (LxC). Both run from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest) on the HSRB’s 5×5 matrix [1][3]. Each score comes with a disposition, such as “Accepted”, “Requires Characterization” or “Requires Mitigation”. These ratings were last approved by NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) in 2/2023 [1].
| Mission | Duration | In-mission (operations) | Long-term health |
|---|---|---|---|
| LEO | Short (under 30 d) | 5x2 · Accepted | Not applicable |
| LEO | Long (30 d–1 yr) | 5x2 · Accepted | Not applicable |
| Lunar orbit | Short | 5x2 · Requires Mitigation/Standard Refinement | Not applicable |
| Lunar orbit | Long | 5x2 · Requires Mitigation/Standard Refinement | Not applicable |
| Lunar orbit + surface | Short | 5x3 · Requires Mitigation | Not applicable |
| Lunar orbit + surface | Long | 5x3 · Requires Mitigation | Not applicable |
| Mars preparatory | Under 1 yr | 5x4 · Requires Mitigation | Not applicable |
| Mars planetary | 730–1,224 d | 5x5 · Requires Mitigation | Not applicable |
NASA rates this risk for operations only. Long-term health is listed as “Not Applicable” [1].
Copied from the Human Research Roadmap on 2026-10-14. Ratings change. Check the live record before citing.
Open knowledge gaps
NASA lists 8 knowledge gaps for this risk, 8 of them open as of 2026-10-14 [1]. Each gap ID links to its page on the Human Research Roadmap (HRR).
Show NASA’s gap list (verbatim)
| Gap | NASA gap statement | Status |
|---|---|---|
| EIHSO-101 | We need to identify the Human Systems Integration (HSI) – relevant crew health and performance outcomes, measures, and metrics, needed to characterize and mitigate risk, for future exploration missions. | Open |
| EIHSO-201 | We need to evaluate the demands of future exploration habitat/vehicle systems and mission scenarios (e.g. increased automation, multi-modal communication) on individuals and teams, and determine the risks these demands pose to crew health and performance. | Open |
| EIHSO-301 | We need to determine the on-board, intelligent systems that will support crew health and performance, and we need to establish the thresholds that will define how these systems should be implemented (including in-mission and at landing). | Open |
| EIHSO-401 | We need to determine how HSI can be applied in the vehicle/habitat and computer interface Design Phase to mitigate potential decrements in operationally-relevant performance (e.g. problem-solving, execution procedures), during increasingly earth-independent, future exploration missions (including in-mission and at landing). | Open |
| EIHSO-501 | We need to determine how HSI will be used in the development of dynamic and adaptive mission procedures and processes, to mitigate individual and team performance decrements during increasingly earth-independent, future exploration missions (including in-mission and at landing). | Open |
| EIHSO-601 | We need to determine individual and team-based Human System Integration (HSI) training procedures, regimens, and standards that are required pre- and in-mission, and post-landing to help reduce demands on crew (e.g., neurocognitive, time); support meaningful work during long-duration missions; and mitigate potential decrements in operationally-relevant performance (e.g., training retention, problem-solving, procedure execution) during increasingly earth-independent, future exploration missions. | Open |
| EIHSO-701 | We need to determine how human-automation-robotic systems can be optimized for effective enhancement and monitoring of crew capabilities, health, and performance, during increasingly earth-independent, future exploration missions (including in-mission and at landing). | Open |
| EIHSO-801 | Given each crewmember will experience multiple spaceflight hazards (e.g. radiation, isolation and confinement, altered gravity), we need to evaluate and identify how HSI can further characterize and/or mitigate additive and/or synergistic effects of the spaceflight environment, for increasingly earth-independent, future exploration missions (including in-mission and at landing). | Open |
See also Open questions.
Active countermeasure research
- Onboard intelligent systems. Gap EIHSO-301 covers systems to support crew health and performance and the thresholds for when to use them [1].
- Design, procedures and training. Human systems integration is being applied to habitat and interface design, adaptive procedures, and training regimens (gaps EIHSO-401 to EIHSO-601) [1].
- Human–automation–robotic teaming. Gap EIHSO-701 covers this [1].
Project-level detail, including status, investigators and results, is in the NASA Task Book and on each HRR gap page.
Clinical articles
For practical, clinic-facing guidance, see:
Evidence profile
- Overall certainty
- ◆◆◇◇ Low (proposed)
- Evidence types
- F · Flight dataE · Expert / operational / standards
- Literature through
- 2026-10-14
- NASA source
- Human Research Roadmap risk page (last published 05/13/25; read 2026-10-14)
Requirements referenced 1
| Requirement | Title | Plain-language meaning |
|---|---|---|
| [V1 4014] | Completion of Critical Tasks | Planned work hours for critical tasks account for crew capability (workload, fatigue). |
IDs as published in NASA-STD-3001 Vol. 1 Rev C (2023-09-15) and NASA-STD-3001 Vol. 2 Rev F (2026-07-14). NASA-STD-3001 binds NASA programs; it is not a regulation for commercial flights. Paraphrased. Standards quick reference.
References 3
- NASA Human Research Roadmap. Risk record: “Risk of Adverse Mission Outcomes Due to Earth Independent Human-Systems Operations”. Accessed 2026-10-14. humanresearchroadmap.nasa.gov/Risks/?i=175 NASA E
- NASA Human Research Program. Evidence report for the Human Systems Integration Architecture risk (approved April 15, 2021). humanresearchroadmap.nasa.gov/evidence/reports/Risk%20of%20I… NASA E
- Antonsen EL, et al. Updates to the NASA human system risk management process for space exploration. NPJ Microgravity. 2023;9:72. doi:10.1038/s41526-023-00305-z PMID:37679359 Peer-reviewed E
Machine-checked on 2026-10-14: each URL resolved, each DOI's title/journal/year matched via Crossref, and claims were checked against the source text (abstract or full NASA page). Human verification against full text is still required before review. NASA documents are U.S. Government works (public domain) and are summarized with attribution; journal articles are summarized, not reproduced.
Article info
- Authors
- Pending (AI-assisted draft)
- Reviewer
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- Last reviewed
- Pending review
- Literature through
- 2026-10-14
- AI-assisted
- Yes (disclosed)
- COI
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- License
- CC BY-SA 4.0
- Use
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- Cite this version
- Pending first edition