# RMP-CARD-001 Cardiac arrest: bring defibrillator and oxygen, stream video (the robot does not run the arrest)
# Version 0.3 (Draft). CONCEPTUAL. NOT FOR CLINICAL USE.
# Space Medicine Foundation robot-readable protocol library. Format: https://spacemedicinefoundation.org/robotic-medicine/protocols/schema/
# Every threshold marked <set by ...> must be set by the named owner (see the schema) before any use.
schema_version: '0.3'
version: '0.3'
status: draft
conceptual: true
not_for_clinical_use: true
max_autonomy: 2
missions:
- leo
- commercial
- moon
- mars
updated: '2026-10-21'
review:
  state: reviewed-ai-assisted
  requested: '2026-10-21'
  reviewed: '2026-10-21'
  human_clinician_review: false
  text: >-
    AI-assisted clinical and source review by the Medical Research Assistant, Oct 21, 2026 (batch 5 review,
    25 required corrections and 18 optional suggestions); all required corrections, and the low-risk editorial
    suggestions, are applied in this version (see Corrections). No named human clinician has reviewed
    it. Not for clinical use.
fixed_rules:
  flight_surgeon_is_medical_authority: true
  cmo_acts_under_delegated_care: true
  human_starts_and_restarts_robot: true
  robot_never_diagnoses: true
  no_drug_or_fluid_advice_by_robot: true
  safe_state_on_fault_or_no_response: true
  lost_link_pause_then_cmo_decides: true
robot_lockouts:
  diagnosis: true
  drug_or_fluid_advice: true
  starting_stopping_or_adjusting_oxygen_or_any_medicine: true
  self_start_or_self_restart: true
  changing_own_protocol_thresholds_or_limits: true
  handing_over_a_mismatched_item_as_verified: true
id: RMP-CARD-001
slug: rmp-card-001
title: 'Cardiac arrest: bring defibrillator and oxygen, stream video (the robot does not run the arrest)'
category: cardio
tier: 1
rung_note: >-
  Max rung raised from 1 to 2 for supervised fetching and video relay, as in RMP-CARD-002 and RMP-RESP-003.
  The robot never starts chest compressions, never fires a defibrillator, and never starts or adjusts
  oxygen.
result_language:
  use:
  - logged, not interpreted
  - sent to flight surgeon
  - EMERGENCY FETCH – NOT VERIFIED (CMO command)
  - as stated by the CMO
  never:
  - normal
  - no problem found
  - all clear
  - negative
  - any diagnosis or cause
  - asystole
  - VF
  - VT
  - PEA
  - shockable
  - non-shockable
  - rosC
  - ROSC
  - pulse present
  - no pulse
  - verified
  - safe
  - mild
  - minor
scope:
  summary: >-
    When a crewmember is unresponsive and not breathing normally, or the CMO starts cardiac arrest care,
    the robot sends an URGENT alert at once, brings the defibrillator (automated external defibrillator
    or vehicle equivalent, unopened) and the closed oxygen kit to the CMO on command, clears space, streams
    video to the flight surgeon when the link allows, records the clock times of CPR (cardiopulmonary
    resuscitation) starts and stops and any shocks as the CMO states them, and after the event reconciles
    kits through RMP-PHARM-001 as an inventory record only. The crew run the arrest under the onboard
    checklist; the robot does not compress the chest, analyse a rhythm, fire a shock or start oxygen.
  why: >-
    Early recognition, early CPR and early defibrillation improve survival from cardiac arrest on Earth
    (AHA 2025 adult basic and advanced life support guidelines; Resuscitation Council UK public CPR and
    defibrillation resources). NASA-STD-3001 requires medical capability including emergency care [V1
    3004], and two trained crew medical officers per vehicle for NASA programs [V1 3006]. There is no
    public NASA flight cardiac-arrest algorithm; the onboard checklist leads. For clinicians only (the
    robot never says, demonstrates or coaches any of this): published microgravity CPR guidance for human
    rescuers (DGLRM/ESAM 2020) uses the Evetts-Russomano method for immediate basic life support and the
    handstand method with the patient restrained on the Crew Medical Restraint System for advanced life
    support; the reverse bear hug appears in earlier parabolic-flight work (Jay 2003; Rehnberg 2014; Braunecker
    2015). Airway devices only with the patient restrained and at least two rescuers. These are Earth-published
    aerospace recommendations, not a NASA flight algorithm. A helper that raises the alarm, brings the
    sealed defibrillator and oxygen kit, keeps paths clear and keeps an exact clock-time record lets the
    CMO and the second trained CMO keep both hands on the patient. Robot chest compressions in weightlessness
    remain research only (see the library research entry). Open question for review: which defibrillator
    type each vehicle carries, and whether video should start automatically on the URGENT alert or only
    on the CMO's command.
  covers:
  - >-
    Unresponsive crewmember who is not breathing normally, or a CMO decision to start cardiac arrest care
  - Post-event kit reconciliation and a package to the flight surgeon
  locked_out:
  - Chest compressions, airway procedures, or any contact with the patient
  - >-
    Starting, coaching or timing CPR or judging pause length (it records clock times only as the CMO states
    them)
  - Saying whether to continue or stop resuscitation, or that further effort is futile
  - Opening the defibrillator pads package or firing any shock
  - Starting, stopping or adjusting oxygen (the oxygen kit is fetched closed)
  - Saying whether a rhythm is shockable, or that a pulse is present or absent
  - Choosing, preparing or giving any medicine
  - Dose-interval cues
  - Recording a check made after a kit was used as a check before use
  related:
  - RMP-CARD-002
  - RMP-RESP-001
  - RMP-RESP-002
  - RMP-RESP-003
  - RMP-PHARM-001
  - RMP-EVA-001
  - RMP-EGR-001
roles:
  medical_authority: Flight surgeon (ground). Holds medical authority for every run.
  onboard_lead: >-
    Crew medical officer (CMO), acting under delegated care; uses the pre-approved onboard checklist when
    there is no link.
  others:
  - 'Second trained CMO: runs or helps the arrest if the CMO is the patient or is alone'
  - 'Other crew: take turns at CPR as the CMO directs'
  robot_may:
  - Send an URGENT alert at once
  - Bring the defibrillator and the closed oxygen kit on command and restrain them within reach
  - Clear loose items from the work space and hold position clear of the CPR area
  - Stream video to the flight surgeon when the link allows and the CMO has not stopped it
  - Record clock times of CPR and shocks as the CMO states them
  - Reconcile kits after the event through RMP-PHARM-001 as an inventory record only
  robot_may_not:
  - Touch the patient or perform CPR
  - Open or fire the defibrillator
  - Start or adjust oxygen
  - Interpret a rhythm or say there is a pulse
  - Suggest or give any medicine
  - Start without a human command
  commercial: >-
    On commercial flights, 'flight surgeon' and 'CMO' mean the operator's designated medical authority
    and trained onboard responder. If no trained responder is aboard, this protocol is not used. (NASA-STD-3001
    requires two CMOs per vehicle for NASA programs [V1 3006]; FAA rules set no medical standards for
    spaceflight participants.)
preconditions:
- id: PRE-1
  text: >-
    A crewmember or the CMO started the protocol by command (for example "cardiac arrest" or "no breathing").
    Nothing starts it from telemetry alone.
  check: human_start == true
  refs:
  - V2 10174
- id: PRE-2
  text: Robot self-test passed; it knows the stowage location of the defibrillator and the oxygen kit.
  refs:
  - V2 10161
  - V2 7059
- id: PRE-3
  text: Robot and supplies restrained when not moving.
  refs:
  - V2 7046
- id: PRE-4
  text: >-
    Link status and current delay known. The CMO never waits for the robot or the link before starting
    CPR.
  check: link_state in [live, delayed, down]
consent:
  standard: >-
    Recording and video by the CMO's agreement when the patient cannot consent; treated as emergency care
    under the onboard checklist.
  emergency: >-
    If the patient cannot agree, the robot proceeds on the CMO's command; the URGENT alert and the record
    stand.
  withdrawal: The CMO can stop video at any time; the URGENT alert and the treatment record are kept.
inputs:
- id: IN-1
  name: >-
    CMO statement that the crewmember is unresponsive and not breathing normally, or that cardiac arrest
    care has started
  source: CMO or crewmember, by voice
  required: true
  if_missing: Log "no response" and keep the URGENT alert.
- id: IN-2
  name: Clock times of CPR start and stop, each shock, and any medicine given, as stated by the CMO
  source: Stated by the CMO
  required: false
  if_missing: Log "not stated".
- id: IN-3
  name: Defibrillator and oxygen kit IDs and seal status
  source: Kit labels
  required: false
  if_missing: Log "not read" if reading would delay hand-over.
- id: IN-4
  name: Link status and delay
  source: Communications system
  required: true
  if_missing: Treat as link down.
steps:
- id: S1
  actor: robot
  rung: 2
  action: >-
    On a crewmember's or the CMO's word, send an URGENT "cardiac arrest / not breathing normally" alert
    to the flight surgeon and the CMO at once. Every URGENT alert goes to the CMO and the flight surgeon
    at the same time (queued for the flight surgeon if the link is down). If the CMO is the patient, is
    busy treating, or does not answer, the alert goes to the second trained CMO, or the crewmember named
    before flight [V1 3006]. An URGENT alert that is not acknowledged within <set by validation> seconds
    is repeated and sent to the next named crewmember. The CMO starts CPR under the onboard checklist
    without waiting for the robot.
  success: Alert acknowledged, or escalated.
  refs:
  - V2 10174
  - V1 6003
  - V1 3006
- id: S2
  actor: robot
  rung: 2
  action: >-
    On the CMO's command, bring the defibrillator (unopened) and the closed oxygen kit to the CMO at once
    and restrain them within reach. This is an emergency fetch on a human command (CMO): no barcode check
    runs before hand-over and nothing waits for one. The robot reads the kit's own label and seal status
    only if that adds no delay, says "EMERGENCY FETCH – NOT VERIFIED (CMO command)", and "seal not intact"
    if so, and hands the kit over anyway. The fetch is logged as an override: time, who asked, the reason
    as stated, kit ID and seal status. It never says "verified". If a crewmember already has them, skip
    this step.
  success: Kits within reach, or step skipped; override logged.
  limit: <set by validation>
  refs:
  - V2 7046
- id: S3
  actor: crew
  action: >-
    The CMO and the second trained CMO run the arrest under the onboard checklist (CPR, defibrillator,
    airway and oxygen as the checklist and flight surgeon direct). CPR and any defibrillator use start
    only on a human decision; the robot never starts, coaches or times CPR as a coach, and never judges
    pause length. The robot stays clear of the CPR area.
  success: Human-led care; robot logs what is stated.
  refs:
  - V1 3004
  - V1 5003
- id: S4
  actor: robot
  rung: 2
  action: >-
    Clear loose items from the work space, hold a position clear of the CPR area, and stream video to
    the flight surgeon when the link allows unless the CMO stops it. Record each CPR start and stop and
    each shock as the CMO states them, on a clock-time timeline only.
  success: Space clear; video on or logged as stopped; times logged.
  refs:
  - V1 6003
- id: S5
  actor: robot
  rung: 2
  action: >-
    After any URGENT alert: After an URGENT alert the robot does not leave on its own: it stays at its
    rest position in the module, with its screen and voice link available, until a human has taken over
    or tells it to go. It never follows, blocks or touches anyone. It keeps time-stamping what humans
    say they did, and repeats the alert if it is not acknowledged.
  success: Robot at rest in the module until a human releases it; alert acknowledged or escalated.
  refs:
  - V2 10173
  - V1 3006
- id: S6
  actor: ground
  action: >-
    The flight surgeon (or the CMO under the onboard checklist when there is no link) decides ongoing
    care, medicines, return of circulation actions and any evacuation [V1 3007]. Whether to continue or
    stop the arrest is decided only by the flight surgeon, or by the CMO under the pre-approved onboard
    checklist when there is no link [V1 3007] [V1 3004]; the robot never suggests stopping. The robot
    logs the decisions.
  success: Decision logged.
  refs:
  - V1 3007
- id: S7
  actor: robot
  rung: 2
  action: >-
    When the CMO says the event is over, run RMP-PHARM-001 reconciliation on each kit fetched: record
    the items the CMO or crew state were used, the remaining contents against the kit list, seal status
    and expiry, labelled "inventory reconciliation after emergency use – not a check before use". Flag
    the override to the flight surgeon and the pharmacy lead, and show each kit as "opened – not restocked"
    until a human restocks and reseals it. Nothing in this step is recorded as a check before the kit
    was used.
  success: >-
    Reconciliation recorded and labelled not a check before use; kit shown as opened – not restocked until
    resealed.
  refs:
  - V2 7059
- id: S8
  actor: robot
  rung: 2
  action: >-
    Send the flight surgeon one package: alert times, CPR and shock timeline as stated, video pointer
    if any, kit inventory record and decisions.
  success: Package delivered or queued.
  refs:
  - V1 6003
  - V1 7001
  - V1 7003
decisions:
- id: D1
  after: S1
  decided_by: crew
  question: Is the crewmember unresponsive and not breathing normally?
  branches:
  - if: 'Yes'
    then: Continue this protocol; the CMO starts CPR now.
  - if: No — responsive or breathing normally
    then: Stop this protocol; consider RMP-CARD-002 for chest pain or other protocols as the CMO decides.
- id: D2
  after: S4
  decided_by: robot
  question: >-
    Checked after every answer and at any point in the run (even mid-question or mid-step): does any answer,
    reading or observation meet a red flag?
  branches:
  - if: 'Yes'
    then: >-
      Stop the current question or step at once and apply the action listed for each matching red flag
      (URGENT alert, flag, or stop), with the answer or reading itself, never a cause. Every URGENT alert
      goes to the CMO and the flight surgeon at the same time (queued for the flight surgeon if the link
      is down). If the CMO is the patient, is busy treating, or does not answer, the alert goes to the
      second trained CMO, or the crewmember named before flight [V1 3006]. An URGENT alert that is not
      acknowledged within <set by validation> seconds is repeated and sent to the next named crewmember.
  - if: 'No'
    then: Continue. The URGENT alert from S1 stands.
- id: D3
  after: S4
  decided_by: robot
  question: Did the CMO answer when asked for a stated time?
  branches:
  - if: 'Yes'
    then: Continue.
  - if: Declined explicitly (the crewmember says no to a question)
    then: Log "declined" for that question only; the alert already sent stands.
  - if: No response, or the answer does not make sense
    then: >-
      URGENT: log "no response" (never "declined"); the CMO, or the second trained CMO if the CMO is the
      patient, checks the crewmember in person at once.
- id: D4
  after: S6
  decided_by: ground
  question: What is the plan (ongoing care, medicines, evacuation)?
  branches:
  - if: Link live
    then: Flight surgeon decides; robot logs.
  - if: Link down or delay too long
    then: >-
      The CMO decides under the pre-approved onboard checklist; the flight surgeon reviews the log at
      the next contact.
stop_rules:
- id: X1
  trigger: The patient (or the crewmember being examined) says stop, or withdraws consent
  action: >-
    Robot stops all motion at once, backs away to its rest position and tells the CMO. Recording stops
    unless the patient agrees to keep it running.
  level: stop
  refs:
  - V2 10165
- id: X2
  trigger: Any crewmember presses stop or takes over control
  action: Protective stop; robot holds its stopped position; only a human may restart it.
  level: safe-state
  refs:
  - V2 10165
  - V2 10168
  - V2 10174
- id: X3
  trigger: Robot fault, sensor fault, or a force, speed or reach limit is reached
  action: Protective stop and hand control to the CMO; log the fault.
  level: safe-state
  refs:
  - V2 10172
  - V2 10168
- id: X4
  trigger: CMO is asked to take over and does not respond (for example, the CMO is the patient)
  action: Robot stays stopped; the next named crewmember is called.
  level: safe-state
  refs:
  - V2 10173
  - V2 7045
- id: X5
  trigger: Loss of link, or delay longer than the limit for live guidance
  action: >-
    Robot pauses any movement in its stopped position and tells the CMO. The CMO decides whether the robot
    continues offline under the pre-approved onboard checklist; the robot resumes only on the CMO's confirmation.
    This stop rule pauses robot movement only: crew CPR, defibrillation and oxygen use continue under
    the onboard checklist without waiting for the link or the robot. Everything is logged and sent to
    the flight surgeon at the next contact.
  level: pause
  refs:
  - V2 10172
  - V2 10173
- id: X6
  trigger: An URGENT alert is not acknowledged within the set time
  action: >-
    Robot repeats the alert and sends it to the next named crewmember (the second trained CMO first if
    the CMO is the patient), and keeps repeating at the set interval. It stays where it is: it does not
    leave on its own.
  level: urgent
  refs:
  - V1 3006
  - V2 10173
- id: X7
  trigger: The crewmember stops responding, or seems confused or drowsy, at any point
  action: >-
    URGENT alert at once, even mid-question or mid-step; the robot stops its current task, stays at its
    rest position and does not continue the run; a crewmember checks in person.
  level: urgent
- id: X8
  trigger: A crewmember asks the robot what is wrong, or for medicine, fluid or treatment advice
  action: >-
    Robot declines, says it cannot assess or advise, and routes the question to the CMO or flight surgeon.
  level: stop
- id: X9
  trigger: The CMO or a crewmember needs the robot's space to reach the patient
  action: Robot moves to its rest position at once and holds; it still does not leave the module on its
    own.
  level: safe-state
  refs:
  - V2 10172
- id: X10
  trigger: Fire, smoke or a toxic release during the arrest
  action: >-
    Robot stops non-essential motion, keeps paths clear and follows the vehicle emergency procedure (see
    RMP-ENV-001); the CMO decides whether CPR continues.
  level: urgent
  refs:
  - V2 9059
red_flags:
- id: RF1
  sign: Unresponsive and not breathing normally, as the CMO or a crewmember states
  threshold: any
  action: URGENT alert; this protocol's S1 already fired; the CMO starts CPR now
  source: aha2025bls
- id: RF2
  sign: >-
    The defibrillator or oxygen kit cannot be found, or its seal is not intact when that can be read without
    delay
  threshold: any
  action: >-
    URGENT alert to the CMO and flight surgeon; the CMO continues CPR and uses the next available device
    under the checklist
  source: ismpadc
- id: RF3
  sign: Only one trained responder is available
  threshold: any
  action: URGENT alert to the next named crewmember and flight surgeon; the robot stays and does not leave
  source: v1
- id: RF4
  sign: Suspected cardiac arrest after a spacewalk or pressure change
  threshold: any
  action: URGENT alert; see also RMP-EVA-001; the CMO still starts CPR now
  source: tb037
- id: RF5
  sign: Return of responsiveness or normal breathing, as the CMO states
  threshold: any
  action: >-
    Flag to the flight surgeon; the CMO continues post-arrest care under the checklist; the robot does
    not say circulation has returned and never says "ROSC" or "pulse is back"
  source: aha2025als
safety_limits:
- id: L1
  name: Contact with the crewmember
  value: not allowed
  enforced: Keep-out zone in the robot controller
  refs:
  - V2 10172
- id: L2
  name: Opening or firing the defibrillator
  value: not allowed
  enforced: No defibrillator-fire or pad-placement task is loaded
- id: L3
  name: Starting or adjusting oxygen
  value: not allowed
  enforced: Oxygen kit handled closed only
- id: L4
  name: Robot speed near the crewmember
  value: <set by validation>
  enforced: Hard limit in the controller
  refs:
  - V2 10172
- id: L5
  name: Closest approach to the CPR area
  value: <set by validation>
  enforced: Distance sensing; the robot stays outside the CPR keep-out
logs:
- id: LOG-1
  text: Every input, robot action, decision (with who made it) and hand-off, time-stamped to the second.
  refs:
  - V2 10163
  - V2 10164
- id: LOG-2
  text: Mode changes and safety-limit events are announced to the operator as they happen and logged.
  refs:
  - V2 10162
  - V2 10172
- id: LOG-3
  text: >-
    Records are stored and sent as private medical data, encrypted, with access limited to the medical
    team.
  refs:
  - V1 6003
  - V1 7003
- id: LOG-4
  text: Results are kept in a permanent, retrievable format so the flight surgeon can see trends.
  refs:
  - V1 7001
- id: LOG-5
  text: Alert time, each CPR and shock time as stated, video start/stop, and kit reconciliation.
- id: LOG-6
  text: >-
    Each URGENT alert, who received it, the time it was acknowledged (or the escalation to the next named
    crewmember), and the time a human released the robot.
  refs:
  - V2 10163
- id: LOG-7
  text: >-
    Each emergency fetch as an override (time, who asked, reason as stated, kit ID, seal status) and the
    later inventory reconciliation, labelled "not a check before use".
  refs:
  - V2 7059
requirements:
- id: V1 3004
  use: >-
    In-mission care includes medical kits (b), emergency procedures and recording treatment; the crew
    deliver care.
- id: V1 3006
  use: >-
    Two trained CMOs per vehicle for NASA programs; the second trained CMO receives alerts when the CMO
    is the patient (see the commercial-flight note).
- id: V1 3007
  use: Medical evacuation when illness is beyond onboard capability; the flight surgeon decides.
- id: V1 5003
  use: CMO training includes medical procedures and equipment; the CMO treats.
- id: V1 6003
  use: Logs and alerts sent to the ground are private medical communications.
- id: V1 7001
  use: Records kept so the flight surgeon can see trends.
- id: V1 7003
  use: Secure handling of medical records.
- id: V2 7045
  use: Usable by non-physician crew, including when the CMO is the patient.
- id: V2 7046
  use: Patient, caregiver and supplies restrained.
- id: V2 7059
  use: >-
    Kit inventory and seal status are tracked; after an emergency fetch the robot reconciles the kit through
    RMP-PHARM-001 as an inventory record (never a check before use) and shows it as "opened – not restocked"
    until resealed.
- id: V2 9059
  use: 'Fire protection system: detecting, warning and extinguishing.'
- id: V2 10161
  use: Robot shows its status and health.
- id: V2 10162
  use: Mode changes are announced to the operator.
- id: V2 10163
  use: Robot records and shares its data.
- id: V2 10164
  use: Shows whether the human or the robot is expected to act.
- id: V2 10165
  use: Human can override and shut down the robot.
- id: V2 10168
  use: Human can take over.
- id: V2 10172
  use: Protective stop when a limit is exceeded.
- id: V2 10173
  use: Robot stays stopped if no one takes over.
- id: V2 10174
  use: Only a human starts or restarts the robot.
validation:
- stage: simulation
  what: >-
    Scripted arrests including a missing kit, a CMO who is the patient, fire during the run, and lost
    link.
  pass: >-
    Zero chest contact; zero shocks by the robot; every emergency fetch logged as an override; unacknowledged
    alerts escalate.
- stage: training model
  what: CMO training on a manikin with the robot fetching the defibrillator and oxygen kit.
  pass: Kits delivered within <set by validation> seconds; the CMO is never delayed or obstructed.
- stage: parabolic or station demonstration
  what: Fetching and restraining the defibrillator and oxygen kit in weightlessness, without a patient.
  pass: Kits delivered closed and restrained.
- stage: flight use under flight surgeon supervision
  what: First use in drills alongside the onboard checklist.
  pass: No safety events; the record is complete.
signoff:
  protocol:
  - Clinical lead for the specialty (sets every clinical threshold marked <set by clinical lead>)
  - Flight surgeon, as medical authority
  - Robotics and medical-device safety board
  - Program approval for the mission
  restart_after_stop: >-
    Human only. After any emergency or protective stop, a crewmember must restart the robot; the robot
    never restarts itself.
  each_run: >-
    Started by a crewmember or the CMO. Every alert goes to the CMO and flight surgeon at once; the crew
    run the arrest.
change_control:
- Every change gets a new version number and a written reason; earlier versions are kept.
- >-
  Any change to steps, thresholds, limits or software that touches the patient repeats validation from
  the simulation stage before use.
- >-
  Software and learned-skill updates follow a pre-agreed change plan (what may change, how it is tested,
  how to roll back), modeled on the FDA predetermined change control plan approach.
- >-
  If a new version misbehaves, the robot rolls back to the last validated version and the event is reviewed
  by the flight surgeon and safety board.
- The robot never changes its own protocol, thresholds or limits.
comms:
  live: 'Low Earth orbit: the flight surgeon receives the alert and video at once when the link allows.'
  loss_of_signal:
  - >-
    The robot pauses non-essential motion and tells the CMO; on the CMO's confirmation it keeps recording
    offline.
  - >-
    The CMO (or the second trained CMO) treats under the pre-approved onboard checklist; nothing waits
    for the link.
  - 'At the next contact the robot sends one package: times, video pointer and alerts.'
  mars_delay:
  - >-
    Replies may take up to about 21-23 minutes each way, with blackouts of about 2-3 weeks; arrest care
    cannot wait for the ground.
  - The onboard checklist and two trained CMOs lead.
sources:
- key: aha2025bls
  text: >-
    Kleinman ME, Buick JE, Huber N, et al. Part 7: Adult Basic Life Support: 2025 American Heart Association
    Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiovascular Care. Circulation. 2025;152(16_suppl_2):S448-S478.
  url: https://doi.org/10.1161/CIR.0000000000001369
  doi: 10.1161/CIR.0000000000001369
  pmid: '41122888'
  supports: >-
    Adult basic life support: initial recognition of cardiac arrest, activation of the emergency response,
    high-quality CPR and use of an automated external defibrillator; also respiratory arrest and foreign-body
    airway obstruction. Earth guidance; the onboard checklist leads. Abstract read via PubMed Oct 21,
    2026; full text not read.
- key: aha2025als
  text: >-
    Wigginton JG, Agarwal S, Bartos JA, et al. Part 9: Adult Advanced Life Support: 2025 American Heart
    Association Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiovascular Care. Circulation.
    2025;152(16_suppl_2):S538-S577.
  url: https://doi.org/10.1161/CIR.0000000000001376
  doi: 10.1161/CIR.0000000000001376
  pmid: '41122884'
  supports: >-
    Adult advanced life support for cardiac arrest (ventricular fibrillation, pulseless ventricular tachycardia,
    asystole, pulseless electrical activity) and peri-arrest conditions such as atrial fibrillation or
    flutter with a rapid ventricular rate; defibrillation, cardioversion, advanced airway, drugs; refined
    termination-of-resuscitation rules. Earth guidance for clinicians; the robot never interprets a rhythm.
    Abstract read via PubMed Oct 21, 2026; full text not read.
- key: aha2025eth
  text: >-
    Elmer J, Atkins DL, Daya MR, et al. Part 3: Ethics: 2025 American Heart Association Guidelines for
    Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiovascular Care. Circulation. 2025;152(16_suppl_2):S323-S352.
  url: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/41122890/
  pmid: '41122890'
  supports: >-
    Ethics of resuscitation, including decisions to continue or stop resuscitation; cited only to show
    that stopping is a clinician decision. PubMed record verified Oct 21, 2026; full text not read.
- key: hinkelbein2020
  text: >-
    Hinkelbein J, Kerkhoff S, Adler C, et al. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) during spaceflight -
    a guideline for CPR in microgravity from the German Society of Aerospace Medicine (DGLRM) and the
    European Society of Aerospace Medicine Space Medicine Group (ESAM-SMG). Scand J Trauma Resusc Emerg
    Med. 2020;28(1):108.
  url: https://doi.org/10.1186/s13049-020-00793-y
  doi: 10.1186/s13049-020-00793-y
  pmid: '33138865'
  supports: >-
    For human rescuers: in immediate basic life support the chest compression method of choice is the
    Evetts-Russomano method; in advanced life support, with the patient restrained on the Crew Medical
    Restraint System, the handstand method. Airway management only with at least two rescuers present
    and the patient restrained. An aerospace-society guideline, not a NASA flight algorithm.
- key: rehnberg2014
  text: >-
    Rehnberg L, Ashcroft A, Baers JH, et al. Three methods of manual external chest compressions during
    microgravity simulation. Aviat Space Environ Med. 2014;85(7):687-693.
  url: https://doi.org/10.3357/asem.3854.2014
  doi: 10.3357/asem.3854.2014
  pmid: '25022155'
  supports: >-
    Three single-person CPR techniques can be performed in microgravity: Evetts-Russomano, handstand and
    reverse bear hug; all evaluated in parabolic flight, only Evetts-Russomano shown effective in prolonged
    microgravity simulation. Human rescuers only.
- key: jay2003
  text: >-
    Jay GD, Lee P, Goldsmith H, et al. CPR effectiveness in microgravity: comparison of three positions
    and a mechanical device. Aviat Space Environ Med. 2003;74(11):1183-1189.
  url: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/14620476/
  pmid: '14620476'
  supports: >-
    Early parabolic-flight comparison of CPR positions (including the reverse bear hug) and a mechanical
    device. PubMed record verified Oct 21, 2026; abstract not re-read in full.
- key: braunecker2015
  text: >-
    Braunecker S, Douglas B, Hinkelbein J. Comparison of different techniques for in microgravity - a
    simple mathematic estimation of cardiopulmonary resuscitation quality for space environment. Am J
    Emerg Med. 2015;33(7):920-924.
  url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajem.2015.04.018
  doi: 10.1016/j.ajem.2015.04.018
  pmid: '25936478'
  supports: >-
    Modelled comparison of microgravity CPR techniques for human rescuers. PubMed record verified Oct
    21, 2026.
- key: rcukcpr
  text: >-
    Resuscitation Council UK. How to do CPR (public resource); Defibrillation (public resource). Pages
    fetched Oct 21, 2026.
  url: https://www.resus.org.uk/public-resource/how-do-cpr
  supports: >-
    Public adult CPR and defibrillator guidance: call for help, start chest compressions, use an automated
    external defibrillator as soon as one is available. Used as open Earth first-aid context for what
    the crew do; the robot never compresses the chest or fires a defibrillator.
- key: ismpadc
  text: >-
    Institute for Safe Medication Practices. Guidelines for the safe use of automated dispensing cabinets
    (2019).
  url: https://www.ismp.org/system/files/resources/2019-11/ISMP170-ADC%20Guideline-020719_final.pdf
  supports: >-
    Override is limited to medicines needed in emergent circumstances where waiting could harm the patient
    (3.3b); limit what is available on override (3.4b); require documentation of the override rationale
    (3.4d); routinely analyze override reports (3.6). Used for the emergency-fetch pattern by analogy
    (a robot fetching a sealed kit is not a dispensing cabinet).
- key: tb037
  text: >-
    NASA OCHMO. Decompression Sickness (DCS) Risk Mitigation. Technical Brief OCHMO-TB-037 Rev D (Oct
    5, 2026).
  url: https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/ochmo-tb-037-decompression-sickness.pdf
  supports: >-
    DCS is caused by inert gas bubbles forming during rapid reductions in ambient pressure, most significantly
    in the move from cabin pressure to EVA suit pressure; NASA classifies DCS as Type I (itching, musculoskeletal
    pain, mild rashes) and Type II (neurological symptoms, numbness, weakness, cognitive issues, inner
    ear problems, cardiopulmonary issues), and describes cutis marmorata (a mottled, patterned skin rash);
    arterial gas embolism can cause stroke-like neurological effects, loss of consciousness and seizures;
    U.S. Navy protocols are widely adopted on Earth; diagnosis is based on symptoms; the majority of cases
    present between 60 and 240 minutes and inflammatory responses can last more than 24 hours; no hyperbaric
    chamber is available in flight, and increasing suit and cabin pressure may be combined to treat symptoms,
    depending on the scenario; a break in prebreathe rapidly reintroduces nitrogen; NASA has never experienced
    a Type II event in spaceflight.
- key: v1
  text: 'NASA. NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human-System Standard, Volume 1: Crew Health, Revision C (2023).'
  url: https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/nasa-std-3001-vol-1-rev-c-with-signature.pdf
  supports: 'NASA-STD-3001 Vol 1 Rev C: V1 3004, V1 3006, V1 3007, V1 5003.'
- key: v2
  text: >-
    NASA. NASA-STD-3001, Volume 2: Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health (Rev F, 2026),
    including Section 10.6 Automated and Robotic Systems.
  url: https://standards.nasa.gov/standard/NASA/NASA-STD-3001_VOL_2
  supports: Requirement IDs beginning V2.
- key: tb044
  text: NASA OCHMO. Medical Operations. Technical Brief OCHMO-TB-044 (2025).
  url: https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/ochmo-tb-044-medical-operations.pdf
  supports: >-
    The crew surgeon keeps medical authority when care is delegated; crew medical officers train on the
    JSC 48522 medical checklist.
- key: marsdelay
  text: >-
    NASA. Mars communications disruption and delay (fact sheet, 2023 Moon to Mars Architecture Concept
    Review).
  url: https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/mars-communications-disruption-and-delay.pdf
  supports: >-
    One-way Earth-Mars delay up to about 21-23 minutes, plus blackouts of about 2-3 weeks near solar conjunction.
- key: pccp
  text: >-
    U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Marketing submission recommendations for a predetermined change
    control plan for artificial intelligence-enabled device software functions (guidance).
  url: >-
    https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/marketing-submission-recommendations-predetermined-change-control-plan-artificial-intelligence
  supports: A model for planning, validating and rolling back software updates.
- key: faa460
  text: 'U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Part 460: Human space flight requirements.'
  url: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-III/subchapter-C/part-460
  supports: >-
    Federal rules for crew and spaceflight participants on licensed commercial flights; they set no medical
    standards for spaceflight participants.
corrections:
- date: '2026-10-21'
  version: '0.2'
  source: >-
    AI-assisted clinical and source review by the Medical Research Assistant, Oct 21, 2026 (batch 5 review)
  items:
  - >-
    Sources updated from AHA 2020 to AHA 2025 Part 7 Adult Basic Life Support (PMID 41122888) and Part
    9 Adult Advanced Life Support (PMID 41122884), labelled Earth guidance; the onboard checklist leads
    (item 1). AHA 2025 Part 3 Ethics (PMID 41122890) added for decisions to stop. Full texts not read;
    foreign-body airway obstruction wording to be re-checked when they are.
  - >-
    The "why" names published microgravity CPR methods for human rescuers, for clinicians only, in crew
    medical officer checklist context: Evetts-Russomano for immediate basic life support, handstand on
    the Crew Medical Restraint System for advanced life support, reverse bear hug in earlier work (DGLRM/ESAM
    2020; Rehnberg 2014; Jay 2003; Braunecker 2015). The robot never says, demonstrates or coaches any
    of it; robot compressions stay research only (item 2).
  - >-
    S3: CPR and any defibrillator use start only on a human decision; the robot never starts, coaches
    or times CPR as a coach, and never judges pause length (item 3).
  - >-
    X5 (link loss): only the robot pauses. Crew CPR, defibrillation and oxygen use continue under the
    onboard checklist without waiting for the link or the robot (item 4).
  - >-
    Stopping resuscitation: new lockout ("Saying whether to continue or stop resuscitation, or that further
    effort is futile"); S6 says only the flight surgeon, or the CMO under the onboard checklist when there
    is no link, decides, and the robot never suggests stopping (item 5).
  - 'RF5: the robot never says "ROSC" or "pulse is back" (suggestion 29).'
  - >-
    Batch 5 drafts now record the review as AI-assisted (Medical Research Assistant, Oct 21, 2026); no
    named human clinician.
- date: '2026-10-21'
  version: '0.3'
  source: Batch 7 editorial (AI-assisted), Oct 21, 2026
  items:
  - >-
    Citation labels changed to the site's year-only convention: "(approved for public release <date>)"
    now reads "(YYYY)", and NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2 "Revision F (approved July 14, 2026)" now reads "(Rev
    F, 2026)" (sources: v2). Editorial; no change to steps, thresholds or limits.
